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ABSTRACT
This paper uses an exclusion restriction variable as the key to resolve an identification problem in self-selection bias of 
a wage regression model. The study basically utilizes Hedonic Wage Theory (Rosen 1986, 1974) to test the relationship 
between vulnerable workers and wage. Analysis was made using the Mincerian semi-log earnings function (Mincer 
1974) specified in the tradition of Becker’s Human Capital Model (Becker 1964) with a correction for self-selection 
bias. A total of 1705 private sector employees were selected and the result showed that the coefficient for predicted 
vulnerable worker variable was significant but non-positive. The implication of this result is that no adjustments in 
wages are made to compensate workers for undesirable job conditions. A third party, namely government interventions, 
is therefore needed in order to protect and enhance the well-being of the vulnerable workers. 
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ABSTRAK
Kajian ini menggunakan pemboleh ubah sekatan pengetepian untuk menyelesaikan masalah bias pilihan sendiri 
dalam model regresi gaji. Secara prinsipnya, kajian ini menggunakan Teori Gaji Hedonik (Rosen 1986, 1974) untuk 
menguji hubungan antara pekerja terancam dan gaji. Analisis dijalankan dengan menggunakan fungsi pendapatan 
Semi log (Mincer 1974) yang diterangkan dalam Model Sumber Manusia Becker (Becker 1964) yang memperbetulkan 
bias pilihan sendiri. Sejumlah 1705 pekerja sektor swasta telah dipilih. Keputusan menunjukkan pekali kepada 
pemboleh ubah pekerja terancam adalah signifikan tetapi negatif. Implikasinya, tiada pembetulan gaji dibuat sebagai 
pampasan kepada pekerja yang terlibat dalam persekitaran pekerja yang tidak sihat. Pihak ketiga iaitu campur 
tangan kerajaan diperlukan untuk melindungi dan meningkat kebajikan pekerja terancam ini.
Kata kunci: Bias; gaji; pilihan sendiri; terancam 
INTRODUCTION
Self-selection bias occurs when the observations in the 
sample are not randomly selected from the population 
from which one would like to draw inferences (Heckman 
1979). In the typical self-selection model, the parameter 
of an outcome equation is estimated from observations 
on individuals who self-selected into the sample on the 
basis of a criterion that is correlated with the dependent 
variable of the outcome equation (Heckman 2010; 
Lavrakas 2008).
The interest of this study is to estimate the expected 
income of a randomly chosen individual if he or she is a 
vulnerable worker. Computing the average income of those 
who actually are vulnerable workers is likely to be biased 
because those observed as vulnerable or non-vulnerable 
perhaps chose their occupation because of their own 
unobserved characteristics and expect to earn a relatively 
high income.
This is due to the fact that the difference in the nature 
between vulnerable and non-vulnerable occupations is 
likely to induce workers to self-select based upon their 
observable and unobservable characteristics such as 
risk and monetary benefits. Vulnerable occupations are 
expected to be more common among male, young, and 
high-skill workers. 
Sources of selection bias are derived from the Hedonic 
wage theory. Specifically, all individuals select their own 
desired job. Workers often avoid working in vulnerable 
occupations that feature 3Ds characteristics (i.e. Dirty, 
Dangerous, Difficult). Although this type of job offers 
higher salary, it is often associated with a high risk, 
unpleasant and uncomfortable working environment. 
Failure to consider this problem may result in a self-
selected sample rather than a random sample which at the 
end produces a bias in estimation.
The Hedonic wage theory basically suggests that 
wages should be equal to labour productivity. Labour 
exploitation takes place in the market if the labour is being 
paid lower than its productivity. This standard labour 
market model is based on assumptions of homogeneity 
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of workers and firms, perfect competition, and profit 
maximization. Under such circumstances, a single wage 
equalizes the quantities of labour supplied and demanded. 
If the wage is too low, the excess demand for workers 
drives the wage up, while if the wage is too high, the excess 
supply of workers drives the wage down. Contrary to the 
basic model, there are clearly differences among the wages 
of individuals. Most of them accept these different wage 
levels as the natural result of living in a competitive 
capitalist market economy.
One of the main neoclassical theories explaining wage 
differentials among workers is the theory of equalizing 
differences, often referred to as compensating differences. 
In the theory of equalizing differences, wage differentials 
are identified as a result of intrinsic properties of specific 
occupations that require wage compensation for negative 
job traits or are compensated for with non-pecuniary 
positive traits. The theory of equalizing differences can 
be traced to Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (Smith 
1776). Adam Smith explained that labourers receive 
different wages due to five factors that are associated 
with job characteristics, such as a worker’s willingness 
to accept a job, level of job difficulty, job sustainability, 
job responsibility, and career prospects. To illustrate, if 
wage is the only criterion for a worker’s willingness to 
accept a job, there are three things that could make the 
wage differ across labour. These factors are level of job 
difficulty, job risk, hygiene, and social status of the job. 
The workers should be paid higher than their counterparts 
if their jobs are challenging, dangerous, and have low 
levels of hygiene and social status. Theoretically, those 
who are willing to work in this kind of environment must 
receive high compensation in the form of higher wages. 
In principle, a labourer prefers to work in a less difficult 
and dangerous occupation.
The goal of this paper is therefore to use an exclusion 
restriction variable as the key to resolve an identification 
problem in self-selection bias of a wage regression model. 
Therefore, the study applies the Hedonic wage model 
(Rosen 1986, 1974) to test the relationship between 
vulnerable workers and wage based on Mincer’s semi-
log wage function (Mincer 1974). The Hedonic wage 
model is based on a traditional human capital Becker 
model (Becker 1984) with corrected self-selection bias. 
Ultimately, the study decomposes wage differentials 
between vulnerable and non-vulnerable workers to identify 
the extent to which observable and non-observable 
characteristics contribute to the wage gap.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, 
the discussion on the Hedonic wage theory is presented. In 
the following sections, the methods and the data used in 
the paper are examined. Subsequent section contains the 
analysis and discussion of the results. The final section 
concludes the paper and outlines some of the possible 
implications of the results.
HEDONIC WAGE THEORY
The relationship between unpleasant job characteristics 
and wage produces the Hedonic wage model (Frank 
1999; Hwang et. al 1998; Rosen 1986, 1974). Instead of 
a single wage, a wage function equilibrates the quantity 
of labour supplied to the quantity demanded at or near 
possible values of the attribute. The fundamental theory 
of Hedonic wage function argues that the difference in 
wages is due to different job characteristics. In particular, 
the Hedonic model of wages corresponds to the idea that 
there are compensating differentials that workers would 
get higher wages for job that were more unpleasant. 
Unpleasant jobs in the Hedonic wage theory feature a 
specific occupational risk. This condition is very similar 
to workers who are in vulnerable occupation. The 
main assumption of the theory is that every worker is 
biased against risk or vulnerability. To be able to attract 
workers to work to an unpleasant job, an increase in risk 
is associated with an increase in wage as well. Similar 
relationships can also be found in employer preference. 
Since a firm’s main objective is to maximize profit, for 
every decrease in risk, there will be a reduction in wage 
so that the production cost does not change. As a result, 
those who receive high wages are those workers who are 
involved in risky or highly unpleasant jobs.
The existing literature, however, does not totally 
support that labourers who work in unpleasant jobs 
earn high wages (Brown 1980; Elliott & Sandy 1998). 
Liu et al. (1997) for example found that there was clear 
evidence that labour wage depends on the risk of the job 
in the Taiwan’s labour market. In contrast, Bocquier et 
al. (2010) found that there was no wage compensation 
for labourers who worked in riskier jobs in seven capital 
cities in West Africa. They concluded that labourers are 
still receiving low wages despite their hazardous working 
environments.
Excess labour supply could be a potential reason to 
explain why research findings have been contradicted 
by the Hedonic wage theory. The excess labour supply 
occurs because workers have no job options due to lack 
of education and skill. In addition, the influx of legal and 
illegal foreign workers into the labour market, at least 
for the case of Malaysia, worsened the scenario. These 
foreign workers, who have at least the same productivity 
level as locals, are preferred due to their low reservation 
wage. Thus, the labour market is in favour of foreign 
workers in terms of employment and job opportunities. 
Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister Department of 
Malaysia reported that there were more than 2 million 
foreign workers in Malaysia during 2015. Majority of 
them concentrated in the construction sector. Therefore, 
to establish a positive relationship between wage and job 
risk, workers should have been given choices to select 
their own occupation.
Many studies (ILO 2013; Law Commission of 
Ontario 2012; Pollert 2007 & 2008; Pollert & Charlwood 
2009; Saunders 2006, 2003; TUC 2006) have shown that 
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vulnerable workers existed in the workplace. Its current 
number is about half of the world’s labour force and it 
is expected to keep increasing (ILO 2013). Vulnerable 
workers are identified based on specific characteristics 
from selected occupational groups considered as 
‘vulnerable’. For example, low-skill foreign workers 
and self-employed workers are often associated with 
vulnerability. In fact, low-skill foreign workers are very 
likely to be vulnerable due to the dirty, remote, and 
dangerous nature of their jobs. The unconducive and 
unsafe working environment, along with long working 
hours, insecure jobs, and limited employment benefit 
can result in a negative effect to the worker’s welfare 
and job security. All characteristics of vulnerable workers 
have been mentioned in many studies (BERR 2008; DTI 
2006; Pollert 2008, 2007; Pollaert & Charlwood 2009; 
Saunders 2003 & 2006; TUC 2007).
Most of the studies on vulnerable workers highlighted 
several important points on the significant existence of 
vulnerable workers and their wage effect in the labour 
market (Julia & John 2013; Lamm 2014; Sgobbi 2015). 
Meanwhile, there are particularly a few studies on 
vulnerable workers that are related to the Malaysian 
labour market (Shamsulbahriah 2016; Zulkifly & 
Hazrul 2017, 2014). Nevertheless, none of the studies 
addresses the problem of self-selection bias in estimating 
the wage effect of vulnerable workers. As a result, the 
estimation could skew in a large way. Specifically, 
the self-selection bias is a type of non-sampling error 
in which the individual observations in a sample are 
demographically or behaviorally different than the 
intended random sample. 
Therefore, the present study contributes to the 
literature by taking into account the problem of workers 
that are self-selected into vulnerable occupations in 
estimating the wage effect. In particular, this study uses 
an exclusion restriction variable as the key to resolve 
an identification problem in self-selection bias of a 
wage regression model. The use of exclusion restriction 
therefore eliminates the bias caused by the workers who 
are self-selected into vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
occupations.
METHODS
SPECIFICATION
The model employed in the present study applied the 
switching regression models with endogenous switching 
developed by Maddala and Nelson (1975) and Nakosteen 
and Zimmer (1980). Two separate income equations were 
utilized for vulnerable and non-vulnerable workers. In 
addition, the model also included an equation describing 
the dichotomous decision to select vulnerable jobs. The 
decision equation served as an endogenous selectivity 
criterion that determines the strategy adopted to find 
employment.
A person chooses vulnerable occupation if 
       (Wi1 - Wi0  )/ Wi0   > βi          (1)
where W
I is the wage received if the individual engages 
in a vulnerable occupation; and WO if the individual 
does not. βi represents direct and indirect costs as a 
proportion of income incurred by individual i if they 
engage in a vulnerable occupation (direct costs include 
cost of purchasing safety or health equipment, while 
indirect costs could include health and safety risk 
incurred). The proportionate costs are represented as a 
function of individual personal characteristics (Xi) and a 
random disturbance term as follows:
         βi  = g(Xi) + ԑi         (2) 
Thus, individual i chooses a vulnerable occupation if 
   Ii*  > 0          (3)
and, does not choose a vulnerable occupation if 
   Ii*   ≤ 0         (4)
where, 
  Ii
* = α0  + α1  [(Wi1 - Wi0) / Wi0] + α2 (g(Xi)) -ԑi      (5)
and,
              Wi1   =  θ0I  + θ1I  Xi  + ԑiI         (6) 
       Wi0  = θ00  + θ10  Xi  + ԑi0         (7)
The vector of explanatory variables in the income 
equations does not necessarily have the same elements 
as those which appear in the decision equation above. 
Furthermore, ԑ
iI
 and ԑi0 are assumed to be normally 
distributed with variances σI2 and σ02, respectively.
Therefore, I*, W
I
 and W0 are endogenous variables. 
I* is not observed, but only the choice of I is observed 
as follows:
           Ii  = 1 if Ii*  > 0            (8)
           Ii  = 0 if Ii*  ≤ 0            (9)
Furthermore, (Wi1 - Wi0) / Wi0 is approximated by 
logWi1 – logWi0. Thus, the model is stated as follows:
   Ii
*  = α0 + α2 [logWi1 – logWi0] + α3 (g(Xi)) - ԑi   (10)
 
ESTIMATION
First, the analysis began by running a probit regression 
model of the vulnerable worker;
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  P (Yi = 1| Xi ) = 1 - ɸ ( -Xi’ β /σ ) 
  = ɸ ( Xi’β /σ )              (11)
Second, an inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is obtained 
from the probit model. The IMR is used to account for 
the self-selection bias in selecting vulnerable occupation. 
The IMR can be written as
   λ
Ii = - (ϕ( Xi’ β) 
            (Φ( Xi’ β)
and for Yi = 0
   λ_oi=-  (ϕ(Xi’ β)
                (1-Φ)(Xi’ β)           (12)
This study used the Hedonic wage theory (Rosen 
1986, 1974) to explain the effect of vulnerable workers 
on wages. This theory was then strengthened by an 
empirical analysis using Mincer wage equation model 
(Mincer 1974). The model was initially based on 
Becker human capital model (Becker 1964). Based on 
the Hedonic theory, a vulnerable variable should yield a 
positive sign. That is, vulnerable workers receive higher 
wages, compared to their non-vulnerable counterparts. 
 Mincer wage equation starts with a standard Ordinary 
Least Square regression incorporated with inverse mill 
ratio to control for self-selection bias as following;
          InWi = ζ0 + ζ1 Si + ζ2 EXPi + ζ3 (EXPi)2 + ζ4 Gi 
+ ζ5 Vuli  + ζ6 Tenuredi + ζ7 Contracti + ζ8 Northi + ζ9 
Centrali + ζ10 Southi + ζ11 Unioni +ζ12 Foreigni + ζ13 
Inverse Mills Ratio + εi                                       (13) 
with, 
lnWi is the natural logarithm of hourly wages; Si is the 
years of schooling; EXPi  is the years of experience 
{(age) - (years of schooling + 6)}; Gi is the Male = 1 and 
= 0 otherwise; Vuli is the vulnerable worker =1 and = 0 
otherwise; Tenuredi  is the tenured position =1 and = 0 
otherwise; Contracti  is the contract worker =1 and = 0 
otherwise; Northi  is the North zone = 1 and = 0 otherwise; 
Centrali is the Central zone = 1 and = 0 otherwise; Southi 
is the South zone = 1 and = 0 otherwise; Unioni is the 
Union member =1 and = 0 otherwise; and Foreign is the 
presence of foreign worker =1 and = 0 otherwise.
The interested variable is vulnerable worker (Vul) with 
a value of 1, otherwise zero (0).
IDENTIFICATION
An ‘exclusion restriction’ is the key to solve an 
identification problem in this selection model by 
incorporating variables that influence an individual’s 
decision in selecting vulnerable or non-vulnerable jobs 
during the first stage regression of the probit model; but 
they are excluded in the second stage of wage regression. 
This exclusion restriction variable is the contract of 
service’s status. This variable contributes to determining 
the propensity score at searching for vulnerable or 
non-vulnerable jobs, but not related to wages obtained. 
Contract of service does not affect labour wage. In 
particular, those who have the service contract are not 
being paid higher than those who do not. According to 
Section 2(1) Work Act 1955, contract of service is defined 
as ‘All verbal and written agreements between employer 
and employee to serve and work in respective employer’s 
firm’. The service contract is a very important document 
for workers to refer to in the event their employers deny 
their labour rights stated in the document. Indirectly, the 
document serves as a worker’s protection from being 
vulnerable in the workplace. Unfortunately, there is no 
legal channel that monitors a proper submission of service 
of contract to the labour. As a result, many of them do not 
have their service contracts. In addition, since the contract 
of service is given at the start of the workers’ employment, 
many have forgotten its content and how it should be used 
when their employers violate the agreement.
WAGE DECOMPOSITION
The present study further decomposed a wage differential 
between vulnerable and non-vulnerable workers. Thus, 
to estimate the wage differentials between the two 
groups, a standard Oaxaca Decomposition (Oaxaca 1973) 
incorporating self-selection bias was employed.  
           
                                                                                 (14)
The first term in the right hand side is the wage gap 
attributable to difference in unobserved characteristics. 
The second term is the wage gap attributable to 
difference in characteristics. The third term of the 
decomposition accounts for the contribution of selection 
bias due to the wage differential between vulnerable 
workers and non-vulnerable workers. 
DATA
2012 LABOUR SURVEY
This paper utilized the 2012 Labour Survey (LS) as a 
sample of Malaysian workers. The data was collected 
for the Department of Higher Education, Ministry of 
Education, Malaysia under the Fundamental Research 
Grant Scheme (FRGS). The main objective of this survey 
was to provide comprehensive information and national-
level estimates for Malaysia’s labour force behavior 
and other information such as demographic status and 
            
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼̅̅̅̅ − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊0̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑋𝑋?̅?𝐼(𝛽𝛽?̂?𝐼 − ?̂?𝛽0) + ( 0XX I  )𝛽𝛽0̂ + (𝜃𝜃?̂?𝐼 I − 𝜃𝜃0 0  )   
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human capital characteristics, employment background, 
individuals’ attitudes and satisfaction at work, and 
a number of geographical dimensions. The LS was 
conducted on a sample of currently employed workers 
between 15 and 80 years of age distributed nationwide. 
It included workers from all regions of Peninsular 
Malaysia. It intended to obtain information from private 
sector employees who earned a monthly income of less 
than RM2000. 
For the present paper, the 2012 LS is particularly 
suitable because it serves as a national sample of 
interviews with workers across all sectors. Moreover, 
it is also the most recent dataset that provides relevant 
information on the current trends among labour in the 
Malaysian labour market (Osman-Rani 1980; Zulkifly & 
Ishak 1998) that were analyzed with different datasets. 
In the analysis, this study concentrated solely on private 
sector employees, the largest sector subgroup. In 
addition to this, this study also restricted the original 
2012 LS dataset to salaried workers between the age 
of 15 and 65, so that self-employed and unpaid family-
employed workers are not included in the sample. This 
is because data gaps will make the calculation of their 
wages impossible. Thus, we were left with a sample of 
1,117 private sector workers. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
With regards to the Malaysian labour market, some 
aspects of the data are worth noting at this point. Table 
1 presents simple descriptive statistics from the sample 
used in the analysis. In panel A, male workers accounted 
for about 42.4% of the population sample. Overall, 
females were the dominant group in this study. In panel B, 
temporary workers were dominated by females while the 
number of males was higher among contract workers. 
Furthermore, panel C shows educational background of 
workers along with their income. The average labour 
years of schooling was 12, thus implying that most of the 
workers had at least a high school certificate. On average, 
most of the respondents were young workers with an 
income of about RM1100 per month. Apart from that, 
males received higher wages than females although 
females had slightly higher years of schooling. This 
finding could be due to a gender wage discrimination; and 
this scenario has taken place in the labour market since 
a while ago (Chua 1984; Latifah 1998 & 2000; Rahmah 
2011; Rahmah & Zulridah 2005; Rahmah et al. 2013).
TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics
Variables Male Female Total
Sample size (Observation) 723 982 1,705
Panel A: Region:
North 71 80 151
Central 182 254 436
South 250 316 566
East 220 332 552
Panel B: Job Status:
Permanent 517 719 1,236
Contract 142 137 279
Temporary 64 279 190
Panel C: Socio-Economic Status:
Mean years of schooling 12.2 12.5 12.4
Mean age 29.0 27.4 28.2
Mean income (RM) 1,192.2 1,033.3 1,112.8
Source: 2012 Labour Survey
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 2 shows a probit regression model of vulnerable 
worker’s status on all individual characteristics. All 
the factors associated with vulnerable workers are 
consistent with previous study (Zulkifly & Hazrul 2014). 
In addition, the present study finds that older workers 
are positively associated with being vulnerable at a 1% 
significance level. As the labour gets older, productivity 
is expected to diminish. This is associated with the law 
of diminishing product of labour which states labour 
production declines after reaching a threshold level. 
Level of education significantly reduces the likelihood 
of being vulnerable at 1%. Those who attend longer 
schooling are expected to have better jobs. These jobs 
typically feature good working condition which possibly 
limits the likelihood of being vulnerable. Therefore, being 
an older worker and possessing a minimum education 
level are likely associated with low productivity. There 
is a huge possibility for employers to employ these 
low-productivity workers on a temporary basis which 
increases their likelihood of being vulnerable. On the 
other hand, foreign workers who complement domestic 
workers could be a good explanation of the negative 
relationship with the unintended choice of being 
vulnerable. The ‘exclusion restriction’ variable, contract 
of service, has a negative coefficient. It explained that 
those who do not have a contract of service are very likely 
to be vulnerable workers. In other words, those who have 
a contract of service are more aware of their rights in the 
workplace. Therefore, having a service contract reduces 
the likelihood of being vulnerable.
Table 3 shows the OLS regression of log wage 
for all workers. Years of schooling, experience and 
experience square show expected coefficients sign 
at a 1% significance level as in human capital theory 
(Becker 1964). The results were consistent with other 
studies such as Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) and 
Zulkifly et al. (2010). In the meantime, the coefficient 
of the worker vulnerability status was significantly 
positive at a 1% level. In particular, a vulnerable worker 
received about a 15% lower wage than a non-vulnerable 
worker. This result contradicted the Hedonic wage 
theory which states that vulnerable workers should 
receive wage compensation in the form of higher salaries 
(Rosen 1986, 1974). This phenomenon arises due to 
the concentration of vulnerable workers in low-skill 
occupations. This is in addition to high unemployment 
rates and the restriction of workers to specific types of 
jobs due to skill, sociological preferences and nature of 
job. Therefore, they have to compete in a very limited 
number of jobs. As a result, the vulnerable workers in 
the labour market suffer from working in unsafe and 
unpleasant conditions as well as earning low wages. 
Due to the small likelihood of being vulnerable, 
male workers earned about 16.2% (1% significance 
level) more than their female counterparts. Male gender 
preference is a key advantage for male worker to obtain 
higher wages.  This also contradicted the Hedonic theory 
on wage distribution of vulnerable workers. On the 
other hand, although non-union workers increase their 
likelihood of being vulnerable workers, they earned 
about 6.4% (5% significance level) more than those 
union workers. This result seems to be consistent with 
the Hedonic wage theory. As non-union workers are very 
likely to be vulnerable, the Hedonic wage theory argues 
that they should be paid higher than union workers as to 
compensate for their unpleasant working conditions. In 
the meantime, the presence of foreign workers reduces the 
wage of domestic labour. The present study has proven 
through the probit model that workers are less likely to be 
vulnerable in the presence of foreign workers. However, 
firms may take advantage from the foreign workers’ low 
reservation wage to offer slightly lower wages to domestic 
labourers since they have limited choices in selecting 
occupations. Nonetheless, the employers who take the 
advantage of not compensating the domestic workers 
with sufficient wages for working in unpleasant jobs 
(vulnerable) could have another possible explanation to 
this phenomenon.
Vulnerable workers yield higher return than 
non-vulnerable workers both in experience at a 10% 
significance level and years of schooling at a 1% 
significance level. As the Hedonic wage theory argues that 
those vulnerable workers should be paid high wages, their 
compensation to education and experience working in an 
unpleasant condition should also be higher than those who 
enjoy working in safe and comfortable environments. 
Furthermore, working in such unsafe conditions typically 
requires certain types of training. In general, this type 
of training is relatively difficult and long. Therefore, 
there is no doubt that the compensation to education and 
experience is higher for vulnerable workers. Additionally, 
they should have invested significant amounts of money 
and time to gain extra education and training. In contrast, 
non-vulnerable workers are expected to spend less on 
training given their current skill and capability. 
Table 4 shows Oaxaca wage decomposition with 
self-selection bias corrected. On average, vulnerable 
workers received about 10% lower wages than their 
non-vulnerable counterparts. The finding confirmed the 
result by Sgobbi (2015) on the wage premium of non-
vulnerable workers over vulnerable workers. Yet, this 
finding contradicted the Hedonic wage theory (Rosen 
1986, 1974). This phenomenon could be explained by 
the high concentration of vulnerable workers in low 
wage occupations. As a result, it causes a wider wage 
gap with non-vulnerable workers. About 41% of the wage 
gap between vulnerable and non-vulnerable workers 
was explained by individual observed characteristics. In 
particular, non-vulnerable workers have some individual 
characteristics advantage over vulnerable worker in wage 
distribution. These observed characteristics could be 
education, skill, and experience advantages possessed 
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TABLE 3. OLS regression of log wage on individual characteristics for all workers
Variables All workers Vulnerable workers Non-vulnerable workers
Vulnerable status -0.147*** (0.022)
Experience 0.012*** (0.003) 0.019*   (0.007) 0.011*** (0.003)
Experience square -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000    (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000)
Years of schooling 0.044*** (0.003) 0.049*** (0.008) 0.041*** (0.004)
Permanent worker 0.205*** (0.026) 0.271*** (0.058) 0.142*** (0.031)
by non-vulnerable workers that are translated into 
higher productivity performance. On top of individual 
advantages, there are unobserved characteristics among 
the non-vulnerable workers who are able to raise their 
wage prospect. Oaxaca wage decomposition showed that 
the unobserved individual characteristics contributed to 
about 29% of the wage differential between these two 
groups. This indicates that employer preferences and 
labour non-quantitative characteristics have significant 
effects on wage differential. In the meantime, one cannot 
ignore the significance of self-selection bias in the wide 
gap between these two groups. In particular, about 29 
percent of the wage differential between vulnerable and 
non-vulnerable was due to the workers’ self-selection into 
vulnerable and non-vulnerable occupations (the present 
study follows all the estimation procedures in order to 
avoid multicollinearity.  Its existence could cause some 
serious problem in validation and interpretation of the 
model (Abdullah 1996; Muhammad et al. 2019). In other 
words, observed and unobserved characteristics only 
account for about 70% of the wage differential between 
vulnerable and non-vulnerable workers. Therefore, 
failure to include selection bias could overestimate the 
contribution of observable characteristics.
TABLE 2. Probit estimates of vulnerable worker status
Variables Coefficients Standard errors
Gender -0.111 (0.100)
Age 0.017       (0.005)***
Foreign Worker -0.585       (0.117)***
Permanent Worker -0.656       (0.139)***
Contract Worker -0.373   (0.193)*
Years of Schooling -0.059      (0.020)***
North -0.807       (0.285)***
Central -0.025    (0.136)**
South 0.277    (0.125)**
Non-Union Member 0.183 (0.139)
Pay Slip -2.032      (0.105)***
Service Contract -0.170 (0.124)
Constant 1.154      (0.311)***
Standard errors in parentheses: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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CONCLUSION
After correcting for selection bias, this study concluded that 
vulnerability does not necessarily increase labour wage; 
thus, contradicting the Hedonic wage theory. In particular, 
those who work in unpleasant jobs do not receive any 
wage compensation. This is because these unpleasant jobs 
seemed to be treated as low-skill jobs. The employers in the 
meantime took this to their advantage by offering lower 
wages to selected workers. Non- vulnerable workers, on 
the other hand, are found to work mainly in high-skill jobs. 
Hence, as a result of occupation segregation, a wage gap 
between these two groups exists. This study concluded that 
wage differential mainly exists due to worker observable 
characteristics. Nevertheless, labourers who self-select to 
work in vulnerable or non-vulnerable occupations cause 
a wider gap between these groups. 
Therefore, there is a need for policymakers to take 
appropriate actions in order to protect and safeguard all 
vulnerable workers in Malaysia’s labour market. Policy 
review must consider various aspects of labour welfare 
such as working hours, number of paid leaves and types of 
paid leaves. This review would able to reduce the labour 
risk of being vulnerable. Vulnerable workers could appear 
in both low- skill and unpleasant jobs. Thus, there must 
be a clear direction in differentiating 3Ds (dangerous, 
difficult, dirty) jobs from low-skill jobs. Workers who are 
vulnerable and worked in low-skill job must remain with 
their current wage. In contrast, vulnerable workers who are 
not in low-skill jobs should be compensated with higher 
wages. The supply of labour in 3Ds jobs will continue to 
drop if vulnerable workers in this type of occupation are 
not properly compensated.
TABLE 4. Wage decomposition between vulnerable and non-vulnerable workers
Panel A: Wage differentials
Mean prediction of log hourly Vulnerable workers 4.860
wages (RM) Non-vulnerable workers 5.389
Log wage differentials -0.529
Panel B: Wage decomposition
Decomposition methods
Standard Oaxaca -0.156 -0.219 -0.154
(29.56%) (41.33) (29.10 %)
Contract worker 0.203*** (0.031) 0.188*** (0.070) 0.156*** (0.037)
North 0.080*** (0.030) 0.114        (0.124) 0.035        (0.035)
Central 0.318*** (0.021) 0.417*** (0.060) 0.295*** (0.023)
South 0.113*** (0.019) 0.140*** (0.050) 0.104*** (0.021)
Foreign Worker -0.008      (0.017) -0.069      (0.063) -0.024      (0.019)
Male 0.163*** (0.016) 0.208*** (0.043) 0.148***  (0.017)
Non-union member 0.061*** (0.021) -0.007      (0.063) 0.063**    (0.022)
Inverse Mills ratio - 0.026       (0.038) 0.042        (0.017)
Constant 0.630*** (0.053) 0.282*      (0.120) 0.667*** (0.062)
Number of observation 1,705 274 1,431
Standard errors in parentheses: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
 𝑋𝑋?̅?𝐼(𝛽𝛽?̂?𝐼 − ?̂?𝛽0) ( 0XX I  )𝛽𝛽0̂ (𝜃𝜃?̂?𝐼 I
− 𝜃𝜃0 0  ) 
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The present study has several limitations. First, the 
information on vulnerable workers is observed in one 
single period. Therefore, it will be interesting for future 
research to address the issue of self-selection bias when 
independent variables could change over multiple periods. 
Second, the present data lacks information on firm’s 
characteristics. Thus, the inclusion of variables such as 
firm size, type of industry, and turnover rate is crucial for 
a better estimation as well as to increase the goodness of fit 
of a linear regression model. Third, the observations in the 
sample are concentrated to all workers in the Peninsular of 
Malaysia only. Therefore, one must consider in the future to 
collect data for workers in West Malaysia as well in order 
to represent a comprehensive national sample. 
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